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The electricity sector is the largest source of GHG emissions in the
world, and reducing these emissions would often be costly. However, be-
cause electricity markets remain often only integrated at a shallow level
(with diﬀerent pricing regulations), many gains from deeper integration
(adoption of marginal cost pricing everywhere) are yet to capture. This
paper assesses the benefits of such deep integration between a "hydro"
jurisdiction and a "thermal" one. It also underscores the ineﬃciency of
trade when pricing rules diﬀer. Our detailed hourly model, calibrated with
real data (from the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, Canada), estimates
price, consumption, emissions and welfare changes associated to fully in-
tegrating electricity markets, under transmission constraints. A negative
abatement cost of $37/tonne of CO2 is found (for more than 1 million
tonnes), cleary illustrating the untapped potential of wealth creation in
carbon reduction initiatives. Furthermore, given the ineﬃciency of shal-
low integration between markets, we find that removing interconnections
between markets is a relatively aﬀordable CO2-reduction opportunity, at
$21.5/tonne.
J.E.L. Classification: F14, F15, L50, L94, Q52, Q56.
Keywords: Market Integration; Regulation; Electricity Trade; Environ-
mental Impacts.
1 Introduction
While many economic and environmental issues become global, electricity mar-
kets, to a large extent, remain local. Many regional integration initiatives are
however in place, but a lot of obstacles slow the transformation of local electricity
markets. For instance, in the United States, strong state-level political opposi-
tion halted in 2005 the plan to implement regional transmission organizations
(RTOs), all following a standard market design (FERC, 2005). Even in Europe,
where a 1996 European Union directive set the objective to progressively open
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the electricity market to create a single market, progress has been slow and
plans had to be revised. If standard microeconomic theory would justify remov-
ing some regulation and barriers to trade, as many natural monopoly features
have disappeared in the electricity sector, only a limited number of states have
opted to harmonize their electricity market with their neighbours’ one. Such
integration would indeed lead to various price and quantity adjustments, with
the associated political economy challenges. These issues remain poorly doc-
umented, as clearly established in a large literature review on regional power
sector integration commissioned by the World Bank (ECA, 2010). Our paper
contributes to remedy such shortcoming by introducing a model allowing to an-
alyze the impact of trade and of a common market between two jurisdictions:
the province of Ontario, Canada where generation is mainly thermal based and
the province of Québec, also in Canada, where hydrogeneration provides most
of the electricity.
Prices, electricity production, consumption levels and greenhouse gases (GHG)
emission levels are estimated under various scenarios, permitting integration
outcomes to be clearly illustrated. Our results show that if the hydro jurisdic-
tion keeps its average cost pricing regulation, while the thermal one maintains
its competitive market, although trade slightly improves total welfare when
ignoring GHG emissions, such emissions increase with trade. The welfare im-
provement amounts to $21.5 per tonne, which can also be interpreted as the
GHG abatement cost associated to transmission capacity removal.
By contrast, we estimate that a negative abatement cost of $37 per tonne
could be achieved with more integration, i.e. if electricity trade is complemented
by the implementation of marginal cost pricing in the hydro jurisdiction. The
story is however not the same for producers and consumers in both markets:
while consumers in the thermal jurisdiction gain from trade and market harmo-
nization, their counterparts in the hydro jurisdiction lose with the end of price
regulation. Producers, on the other hand, lose with trade in the thermal juris-
diction but increase their profit in the hydro one. When transmission capacity
increases, all these impacts become greater.
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. In section 2, we provide
a literature review. Section 3 presents the detailed hourly model, empirically
calibrated relative to the Canadian electricity markets of Ontario and Quebec.
The Ontario market stands for the competitive "thermal" market while the
Quebec market stands for the average cost pricing "hydro" market. Results are
discussed in section 4 and a conclusion follows.
2 Literature Review
Most of the literature on electricity market reforms is concerned with compe-
tition levels, market design, transmission pricing rules and other issues, in a
context of isolated electricity markets. See for instance the books of Newbery
(2000) or Stoft (2002) and the large literature they refer to. Despite the impor-
tant potential benefits of regional electricity market integration, the literature
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on such harmonization reforms is limited.
Such conclusion is documented in a large literature review made for the World
Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, see ECA (2010). It
states that there are "few academic studies which have real theoretical depth
[on regional power sector integration]" (ECA, 2010: 2) and also that there is
a need for "theoretical analysis of the way in which benefits are distributed"
(ECA, 2010: 12). This happens in a context of many initiatives promoting such
regional power sector integration, especially in developing countries. See for
instance WEC (2005) and UNECA (2006) for perspectives from international
organizations on energy integration in Africa. UN (2006) attempts to makes the
case for international electric power grid interconnections, while clearly under-
scoring potential costs and institutional challenges. World Bank (2010) draws
lessons from the study of various integration cases, both in developed and devel-
oping nations, and from a literature review (ECA, 2010). This literature review
summarizes the following expected benefits from regional integration: improved
economic eﬃciency (in a broad sense), reduced costs (in operation and invest-
ment), improved supply conditions and various possible social, environmental
and even political gains (ECA, 2010: 4-5). There is however no mention of
any rigorous analysis of such benefits or subset of benefits. If some assessments
have been occasionally made, such as the economic benefits of RTOs in the US
(IFC, 2002), they remain at a very general level, with scarce information on
the distribution of benefits (among regional producers and consumers) and on
environmental impacts. An exception is Finon and Romano (2009), who dis-
cuss the impact of market integration on producer’s profits, in the lower cost
jurisdiction. Yet, welfare remains absent from their analysis.
A key issue in electricity market integration is the protection of "native
load", which is associated to "end-use customers that the Load-Serving Entity
is obligated to serve" (NERC, 2011). In most cases, such obligation comes with
a regulated price based on the local production costs, which can be especially
low if large amounts of hydropower are available. In the United States, fed-
eral regulation to promote wholesale competition protects such native load by
not making generation and transmission capacity planned to meet native load
available to non-local purchasers. See in particular the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission (FERC) orders 888 and 890. This limits integration at a
shallow level, by only allowing limited transactions, and maintains potentially
important price diﬀerences between neighbouring markets.
Our paper presents a two-market model to assess "shallow" and "deep" in-
tegration, to use the World Bank (2010) terminology. In the first case, the two
jurisdictions are interconnected but keep their distinct market organization: one
is competitive and the other one follows an average-cost pricing regulation. In
the second case, both jurisdictions are competitive: native load commitments
are removed. Change in outcomes can clearly be observed from the three inte-
gration regimes: no interconnection (autarky), shallow and deep integration.
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, by proposing a model allow-
ing a straightforward comparison of shallow and deep integration outcomes,
with detailed impacts on consumers, producers and emission levels. Second,
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by providing empirically-based welfare estimates of GHG abatement costs in
the electricity sector. Also, by including transmission constraints and costs, we
better captures the influence of transmission and of the cost of transaction in
electricity trade.
The paper builds on a stream of papers dealing with associated topics. Bil-
lette de Villemeur and Pineau (2010) identifies conditions under which trade
between two jurisdictions is environmentally damaging, without, however, look-
ing at any change in market organization. Billette de Villemeur and Pineau
(2012) focuses on such market changes (integration regime changes), but from
a purely theoretical perspective, and without considering intertemporal arbi-
trage possibilities in the hydro jurisdiction. In Billette de Villemeur and Pineau
(2012), a key result was the decrease in total consumption under deep integra-
tion, as compared to shallow integration, while welfare increased. This results
is empirically illustrated in this paper, further making the point that deep in-
tegration would be beneficial, at least from an environmental perspective.
Intertemporal arbitrage possibilities are studied in Billette de Villemeur and
Vinella (2011), but on a single market. The basic model we use, and expand,
comes from Førsund (2007). However, in his study of hydropower economics,
Førsund does not look at a regulated hydro jurisdiction trading with a com-
petitive one, as we do here. His model has recently been used in Green and
Vasilakos (2012), to study wind and hydro trade between Denmark and Nor-
way. These two countries have a competitive market. In this paper, we use the
setting of Ontario and Quebec, two neighboring Canadian provinces, engaged
in trade, but with very diﬀerent pricing rules.
3 Trade in Electricity Markets: A Multi-period
Analysis
Our model, formally presented in section 3.2, focuses on the role of hydropower,
which requires including multiple periods when storage is available. Indeed,
thermal electricity is seldom constrained by the available quantity of primary
energy (uranium, coal, natural gas or oil). As compared to demand fluctuations,
production costs can essentially be considered stationary. Market equilibrium
analysis can thus legitimately be performed in a static framework when the
whole electricity supply steams from thermal technologies. By contrast, absent
water storage, hydropower supply is almost completely inelastic, due to the ex-
ogenous character of water provision (i.e. water inflow from rainfall). With a
dam, hydro production profile can instead be easily modulated to meet a time-
varying demand. Indeed, water reserves can be almost freely allocated across
time if there is suﬃcient storage capacity. There is thus room for arbitrag-
ing, whatever the objective of the utility. As pointed by Billette de Villemeur
and Vinella (2011), this gives hydropower an important role in the working of
electricity markets, beyond that attached to its actual market share.
The high investment costs and the low marginal costs attached to hydroelec-
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tricity generation make of power plants "natural monopolies", in relatively small
and isolated electricity markets. This may explain why, in hydro-dominated elec-
tricity markets, the price of electricity is very often regulated. More generally,
this calls for specific competition policies in jurisdictions were generation is pre-
dominantly hydro-based (see Rangel 2008).
The persistence of price regulation has very important consequences for mar-
ket integration outcomes. In fact, assuming price regulation in the hydropower
jurisdiction (hereafter referred to as ), neither price nor demand should vary
in that jurisdiction with the introduction of trade. This says that, absent ra-
tioning, the sum of the trade flows should add up to exactly zero (no "loss of
resource" for -consumers). As a result, it must be the case that total pro-
duction in the thermal jurisdiction (hereafter referred to as ) is also equal
to total consumption is this jurisdiction. This says that, the sole consequences
of "shallow integration" go through the intertemporal redistribution of produc-
tion, thanks to the arbitrage possibility oﬀered by hydropower. Clearly, absent
demand fluctuations, there is no place for trade. If instead price happens to vary
in , intertemporal arbitrage may help to improve upon both eﬃciency and
profitability, even if the -producer has native load commitments.
The introduction of electricity trade has radically diﬀerent consequences if there
is "deep integration", i.e. if, after the introduction of trade, prices are market-
based in both jurisdictions. In fact, both the price regulation and the interaction
with a trading partner with higher production costs call for a price increase in
 Thus, while total hydropower supply remains unchanged because it is com-
pletely independent from the pricing policy in the short run, there is a positive
net power outflow from  to  It follows that price decrease in  and ther-
mal electricity now represents a fraction of  consumption. Importantly, these
gross eﬀects add up to the intertemporal arbitrage already evidenced in the case
of "shallow integration" that pertains in the case of "deep integration". This
makes of importance to adopt a multi-period model, even for the analysis of the
later case.
In this paper, we refer to the case of Ontario (a jurisdiction where generation
is mostly thermal and prices market-based) and Québec (a jurisdiction which
rely essentially on hydropower and where prices are regulated on the basis of
average costs). To make the results clearer, we will assume that jurisdiction
 holds no hydro storage capacity while  only produces hydropower with
storage capacity (we ignore multiyear water management possibilities). We
focus on this particular case in order to be able to provide figures and to illustrate
our previous theoretical results (see Billette de Villemeur and Pineau 2010 and
2012) and their multi-period extension provided here. Yet, our results are of
more general interest as the modelled situation is far from being unique: British
Columbia, another Canadian province with regulated hydropower and storage
capacity, actively trades with Alberta, its competitive thermal neighbor, as well
as with its Southern US neighbours. In the US, large hydro provides more than
66 000 MW of capacity (EPRI, 2007) and with 73% of this hydro owned by
federal and non-federal public organizations (Hall and Reeves, 2006), most of
this hydropower is sold at average cost, instead of being sold at market price.
5
We now introduce some brief additional background on Ontario and Québec,
before presenting the three trade regimes of interest, along with the formal
model. In a third subsection, we present the detailed outcomes of our calibrated
model.
3.1 Description of the Two Markets
Ontario and Quebec are two Canadian neighboring provinces. Despite its larger
population of 12.8 million (against 7.7 million for Quebec), Ontario has signif-
icantly less generation capacity: 31 056 MW in 2007 (IESO, 2007) compared
to 46 220 MW for Quebec (MRNF, 2009). The structure of the two markets
is also very diﬀerent, notably because Ontario relies on all types of generation
capacities (however mostly thermal), while Quebec relies almost exclusively on
hydropower (92% of its capacity). Its main hydroproducer has a yearly hy-
dropower production of about 190 TWh, with a storage capacity of 175 TWh
(Hydro-Québec, 2008).1 Ontario has a hourly price set in a competitive spot
market (with some share of its generation still sold at a regulated price; see
IESO, 2009), which resulted in an average hourly price of $47.81/MWh in 2007
(IESO, 2008a). Electricity is entirely sold at a regulated price in Quebec, close
to $27.90/MWh.2 This price represents the estimated cost of the "heritage pool"
of 165 TWh dedicated to Quebec consumers (Hydro-Québec, 2008). Because
many suppliers compete in the Ontarian spot market, while Hydro-Québec dom-
inates in Quebec (88% of the overall production), these two markets are a good
illustration of the theoretical context we wish to study. Furthermore, electricity
is traded over transmission lines that can supply up to 1,295 MW from Quebec
to Ontario, and up to 720 MW from Ontario to Quebec (HQ TransÉnergie,
2006). This interconnection only changed in 2010 with the addition of about
1,000 MW of transmission capacity in both directions. The situation between
the two provinces represents a "mixed market structure with trade" (or shal-
low integration): Ontario sells electricity at marginal cost within its border and
Quebec at average cost. Exports and imports, are done at the Ontario marginal
cost, unless transmission constraints are binding.
We focus on the Ontario-Quebec trade relationship despite many other in-
terconnections (for both jurisdictions) for a variety of reasons: a lot of data
from the Ontario market is available, the Quebec hydropower capacity and pro-
duction are very important (and could have regional implications if managed
diﬀerently), there is an active and still developping electricity trade history be-
tween Ontario and Quebec and, finally, it would probably be easier to harmonize
pricing rules within a single country than between jurisdictions in two diﬀerent
countries. Having said this, nothing in our empirical choices is central to the
core findings of our paper. We could have used the Quebec-New York or British
1BC Hydro, by comparison, produces about 50 TWh of hydropower and usually keeps
more than 10 TWh in storage (BC Hydro, 2012).
2 165 TWh are sold at this price, and the remaining energy is either produced or purchased
at a diﬀerent cost. The final energy price to consumers is the average procurement cost, which
remains close to $27.90/MWh.
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Colombia-Alberta situations for illustrative purposes.
3.2 The model
We adopt the multi-period "bathtub" framework introduced in Førsund (2007)
for our analysis. The model uses fixed capacity and is not intented to explore
dynamic capacity investment issues. The original model provides a simple way
to analyze the "optimal" use of hydro and thermal generators over several ju-
risdiction with varying demand. Absent externalities, if markets are competitive
everywhere, the constrained optimisation problem that maximizes social welfare
gives rise to a solution that also correspond to the market equilibrium outcome.
This explains why Førsund’s framework is also used as a tool for positive analy-
sis, e.g. to analyze the actual eﬀect of competing hydro, thermal and also wind
generators on price and demand patterns. See Førsund et al. (2008) and Green
and Vasilakos (2012).
Our contribution consists precisely in studying the consequences of having elec-
tricity markets that are not competitive everywhere. We evidence however that,
even in the case where average cost pricing prevails in one market, the frame-
work can easily be adapted for the equilibrium outcome to still correspond to
the solution of a (slightly modified) optimisation problem. This allows us to use
a unified approach to address the issue of market integration when institutional
arrangements diﬀer across jurisdictions.
Generation takes place within two provinces, thermal () and hydro ()
as characterized by their dominant technology. More precisely, in jurisdiction
, while the nuclear provides the base load, most of the power is generated by
generators endowed with a thermal technology (coal, gas).3 We denote by 
the electricity production within  at period  The industry-wide production
cost function is denoted  ¡ ¢. Since the cost function is considered at
the aggregate level and total consumption in the jurisdiction never exceeds the
production capacity, there is no need to introduce capacity constraints.4
In jurisdiction  electricity generation almost exclusively steams from hy-
dropower. We denote by  the electricity production within  at period 
Hydro-generators have a marginal cost of zero. Yet, we introduce the (oper-
ations and maintenance) costs  attached to production in jurisdiction .
Although they won’t play any role in the time distribution of the energy pro-
duction, they shall account for the (regulated) price in jurisdiction Obviously,
the yearly production cannot exceed the total available water in reservoir 
3 Since Ontario progressively phased-out coal power plants after 2007, coal will not be not
used after 2014 in Ontario, see Pineau (2013).
4 Indeed, with the so-called "reserve margins requirements" (as imposed for system reliabil-
ity), there is excess capacity in most power systems, as it is the case in Ontario. In 2013, this
reserve margin was 18% - meaning that total capacity was 18% above peak demand (IESO,
2013). Being interested in resources allocation within a given system of two interconnected ju-
risdictions with no capacity shortage, and not in capacity addition within this system, ignoring
capacity constraints for generation has no influence on our results.
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where, in our data,  indexes the 8,760 hours of the year 2007.
There is a well organised power market in  so that we assume that all
generators in this jurisdiction behave competitively. Power is thus priced at
marginal costs and we have
 =  0
¡ ¢ 
where  stands for the price of power in jurisdiction  at period . By
contrast,  , the price of power in jurisdiction  at period  is supposed to be
regulated, at least in some scenarios (our regimes 1 and 2). If so, the price 
is assumed to be equal to the average cost and constant over a year, as it is the
case in regulated electricity markets.5
Exports of  (into),  , and imports into  (from),  are supposed
to be traded at price  on market . Yet we allow for transmission costs so that trade does not occur if the price diﬀerential across jurisdiction is not
large enough. As usual, we follow the convention that both jurisdictions cannot
export at the same time. However, we account for the fact that transmission
capacity are direction specific. Moreover, their availability varies across time.
We account for both aspects by introducing  and   the time-specific upper-
limits of respectively,  and  
There is a (varying) demand in each jurisdiction, 
¡ ¢ and  ¡ ¢.
We assume that their respective inverse function 
¡ ¢ and  ¡ ¢ pro-
vide the marginal (social) value of power in each jurisdiction.
This paper is intended to study the eﬀect of "shallow" and "deep" integration
of electricity markets on prices, quantities, firms profits and consumer welfare.
More precisely, we aim at comparing three diﬀerent regimes:
• In Regime 1, there is a "mixed" market structure6 and both jurisdictions
are in autarky (no transmission capacity).
• In Regime 2 (shallow integration), there is still the "mixed" market struc-
ture but trade is possible, with transmission constraints.
5Regulated electricity rates are usually changed once a year, and remain con-
stant otherwise. See for instance the regulated rate pages of two "hydro" power
systems: Hydro-Quebec (http://www.hydroquebec.com/residential/understanding-
your-bill/rates/residential-rates/rate-d/) and Seattle City Light
(http://www.seattle.gov/light/Accounts/Rates/ac5_erps25_1.htm). This is also the
case for the nuclear-dominated system in France (http://particuliers.edf.com/oﬀres-d-
energie/electricite-47378.html).
6Competitive market in jurisdiction  while in jurisdiction , average cost pricing pre-
vails.
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• In Regime 3 (deep integration), market are fully integrated, albeit with
transmission constraints. These constraints prevent the price across ju-
risdictions to be always unique, but marginal cost pricing prevails every-
where.
The shift from Regime 2 to Regime 3 corresponds to an institutional change
in jurisdiction  that would result in marginal cost pricing. Let us note that
such a change does not necessarily require a complete reorganization of the
industry (i.e. the fragmentation of the monopoly and the creation of a power
market). It may simply follow from a change in the regulatory policy.
The two markets are studied as if there were no connections with other
neighboring markets. In practice, we considered their commercial exchanges as
being part of each jurisdiction. Imports from other jurisdictions are considered
produced in the jurisdiction, exports are considered consumed in it.
3.2.1 Optimal water use on a regulated market
For an average cost pricing policy to be implemented meaningfully, it is not
suﬃcient to set the price. Some supply obligations constraints are also to be
introduced, or at least considered. This is especially true if energy operators
are allowed to trade with other jurisdictions. In fact, producers will privilege
markets that oﬀer them better opportunities while restraining (and possibly
cutting) their supply to less profitable markets. This explains why, wherever
there is price regulation, operators are also subject to other obligations regarding
energy provision.
In this paper, we assume that the regulated producer in jurisdiction  has a
supply obligation toward all clients within this jurisdiction (see equation 4). It is
also assumed that the (regulated) price  is set at the average cost of providing
energy to all its clients. Thus, in jurisdiction , price and consumption does
not depend on water allocation; moreover, the sole (unregulated) profits of the
regulated operator streams from trade.
By definition energy balance in the system requires that, in each moment 

¡ ¢ =  +  −   (2)

¡ ¢ =  +  −   (3)
The pattern of energy production
¡   ¢ and of trade flows ¡   ¢ are
chosen by the operators as to maximize their profits. In doing so, however, they
are subject to several constraints. There are first constraints attached to the
capacity of both the thermal and the hydro generators. As they appear to
almost never be binding, due to reliability margins, we choose to ignore them
from the outset. For the hydro-production, there are also constraints attached
to the replenishment of reservoirs.7 Again, we choose to ignore them because
7Replenishment cannot go beyond reservoir capacity and below a minimum level, gener-
ally resulting from environmental considerations. Also, the water level in a reservoir has an
influence on the production level, due to height diﬀerences.
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as long as there is some accessible storage capacity, they become irrelevant to
what we want to study. Other constraints however are not purely theoretical.
In particular, as already stated in (1), the yearly hydropower production cannot
exceed the total amount of available water. We shall denote by  the shadow
value of this constraint, to be interpreted as the (implicit) "price of water".
The observation of the trade pattern across jurisdisctions makes it also clear
that transmission capacity constraints can be binding. We denote by  their
(time-specific) shadow value.8
Transmission capacities are small enough for the hydroproducer to be consid-
ered as a price-taker provider (or buyer) on the competitive market  Water
availability and energy provisions obligations make it clear that the hydropro-







¡ ¢  (4)
where  is set by the regulator. It follows that:
Proposition 1 Computing the equilibrium in Regime 2 amounts to solve the
optimization program
max




"Z  + −
0
 ()  − 





¡ −  ¢ ≤ − 8760X
=1

¡ ¢  −  ≤  −  ≤  
all  = 1  8760
This proposition is adapted from Førsund (2007), where we include here a
regulated hydroproducer and transmission costs ( ). Let’s note that to char-
acterize Regime 1, we simply need to set  =  = 0
Absent transmission constraints, price patterns are easily characterised. If
  0 then  =  +  ; if   0 then  =  −  ; if  =  = 0
then
−  ≤  =  0
¡ ¢ ≤ +  
This says that, despite abundant hydro resources, price fluctuations may arise
in a power-system as a result of the sole transmission costs. This is consistent
with the observation that transmissions constraints are actually rarely binding,
while prices are almost never identical even in adjacent periods; see Pineau and
Lefebvre (2009).
Limited transmission capacities may explain why the presence of hydropower is
not suﬃcient to prevent extreme prices. We establish the following characteri-
zation of Regime 2 prices:
8Because we assume that both jurisdictions cannot export at the same time, there is no
need to introduce a multiplier for each of the (direction specific) transmission capacity.
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Proposition 2 In Regime 2, when  is exporting, the price in jurisdiction 
is at most  = −   When  is importing, the price in jurisdiction  is no
less than  = +  . If  =  = 0 then
   =  0
¡ ¢  
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Observe that the shadow price of water  = (L ) a priori diﬀers from
the regulated price   Because the hydro-producer in  is actually arbitraging
between high-price and low-price periods in  it may well be the case that
  0 and  =     Yet, the values of  and  are not completely un-
related. The higher   the smaller consumption in  the larger the propensity
to export toward jurisdiction  and thus the smaller  The environmental
impact of trade in Regime 2 depends on many factors, especially demand and
supply elasticity as well emission intensity for diﬀerent levels of production.
Such impacts have been studied in Billette de Villemeur and Pineau (2010) and
some additional results are presented later in this paper (see in particular Tables
5 and 9).
3.2.2 Comparison of shallow and deep integration
In the deep integration regime (Regime 3), native load commitments are re-
moved in  and both jurisdiction apply marginal pricing policies. This situation
was already studied by Førsund (2007) see in particular his problems 6.26 and
6.29. We restate his results to ease the comparison with Regime 2:
Proposition 3 (Førsund (2007)) - Computing the equilibrium in Regime 3
amounts to solve the optimization program
max






hR  + −
0
 ()  − 
¡ ¢−  −  iP8760
=1
R  + −
0







 ≤  −  ≤  −  ≤  
all  = 1  8760
If welfare comparisons across regimes are to be made, the gross surplus of
consumers in jurisdiction  and the costs of hydro-production are to be added
to the program presented in Proposition 1 to study shallow integration:
8760X
=1
Z  ( )
0
 ()  −   (5)
This constant term was cut out because it clearly does not aﬀect water alloca-
tion.
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It should be clear that the overall welfare will be higher in the deep integration
regime than in the shallow one, the "augmented" program of Proposition 1 diﬀer
from the program of Proposition 3 by the sole addition of constraints, formally
 +  −  = 
¡ ¢ 
The shift from Regime 2 to Regime 3 may yet meet resistance since the overall
improvement that would follow such a change does not mean that all stakehold-
ers would benefit from it.
The structure of the price pattern is identical in both regimes, with the only
diﬀerence that the "price of water"  is now equal to the prevailing equilibrium
price in jurisdiction that we denote by   This says that the threshold prices and  a priori diﬀer.
Proposition 4 In Regime 3, when  is exporting, the price in jurisdiction 
is at most  =  −   When  is importing, the price in jurisdiction 
is no less than  =  +  . If  =  = 0 then
   =  0
¡ ¢  
Proof. See appendix A.2.
It is noteworthy that price in  remains constant even after price regulation
is removed. Indeed, price volatility is usually an important characteristic of
deregulated electricity markets (see for instance Zareipour et al., 2007). One
could thus fear it would be a necessary outcome of deregulation in the  ju-
risdiction. Our paper shows that this is not so. The intuition behind this result
is however straightforward: if price in  was higher during some hours, then
(price taker) producers would simply sell more during these hours, driving down
the price with additional supply. If on the contrary price was lower during some
hours, supply would contract, and the price would increase. This is of course
only possible in a hydro system with enough storage and constant production
cost, where water power can be freely allocated across time periods. The price
in  is the marginal value of water over the entire horizon considered.
3.3 Model Calibration
In the following subsections, we provide details on the model calibration. Real
supply and demand data for Ontario and Quebec have been used, along with
some necessary assumptions and approximations on production costs and con-
straints, demand elasticity and emissions.
3.3.1 Demand Data for Ontario and Quebec
Because the Ontario electricity market is open and competitive, hourly demand
and price data are publicly available on the Ontario Independent Electricity
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System Operator (IESO) website. Hydro-Quebec does not release the hourly
demand, but has to share with the North American Electric Reliability Corpo-
ration (NERC) monthly data on its peak load and total energy supply (NERC,
2008). Figure 1 illustrates peak demand and total monthly consumption for
both markets. It can be observed that peak demand and energy consumption
is higher in Quebec during winter, due to heating. This represents a major
diﬀerence between the Quebec and Ontario electricity systems. This pattern is
reversed during the summer, due to air conditioning.
Total power demand was 152206 TWh in Ontario and 185828 TWh in
Quebec in 2007 (IESO, 2008b, NERC, 2008). As we need hourly data for the
Quebec market but don’t have them, these data have to be estimated. Knowing
the monthly total consumption and peak load for Quebec, knowing also that
daily load patterns in Ontario and Quebec are mostly similar due to the proxim-
ity of both markets, hourly demand data have been reconstructed for Quebec,
based on the Ontario demand pattern. See Appendix B for more details on how
this is done. The fact that Quebec has a winter peak and Ontario a summer
peak does not represent a problem for such data reconstruction. This is because
daily load curves have the same shape: low night loads, morning and evening
peaks with a "shoulder" load between them.
Using these hourly price and demand values, 8 760 hourly linear demand
curves are estimated for every hour  and each province:
 =  −    (6)
 =  −    (7)
In addition to price and quantity data, a price elasticity value of −015 is
used to compute the values of parameters  and  ( = ). This elasticity
value reflects the short-term (in)elasticity of electricity consumption. See Lijesen
(2007) for a survey of price elasticities in the electricity sector.
3.3.2 Supply and Marginal Cost Data
Table 1 presents the breakdown of the nominal generation capacity in Ontario
and Quebec. This capacity is however not always technically available (as in-
dicated by the "capability factor") and even less used (as indicated by the
"production factor"). The capability factor reflects maintenance and occasional
breakdowns. The production factor reflects the fact that it can be either un-
economical or impossible to produce. Data for the capability and production
factors are observed 2007 data for Ontario (IESO, 2007). Nothing is shown for
Quebec because there are no available public data.
For the sake of keeping the model of the supply side simple, the following
assumptions are made. Ontario nuclear and hydro capacities are bundled and
represent 12 694 MW of capacity (after capability and production factors are
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Coal 6 285 68% 42% 0
Natural Gas 2 766 90% 54% 550
Hydro 7 906 92% 45% 42 640
Nuclear 11 365 81% 75% 675
Oil 2 100 79% 5% 1 470
Wind 409 100% 30% 431
Wood Waste 225 81% 48% 454
TOTAL 31 056 46 220
*IESO (2007) **MRNF (2009) and Hydro-Québec Production (2009)
Table 1: Generation Capacity in Ontario and Quebec
in Ontario is run-of-river hydro with no storage capacity. Applying again the
capability factor to thermal production, we allow only for 4 265 MW of coal
capacity and for 4 145 MW of combined natural gas and oil capacity. Wind
and wood waste are not modelled because they represent only a small share of
the capacity in Ontario (2%, and even less of the actual energy production).
For Quebec, no capacity constraint is used, but an energy constraint is de-
fined: 184705 TWh of hydroelectricity can be produced. This value comes from
the 2007 Quebec electricity demand (185828 TWh, from NERC, 2008) minus
net imports from Ontario (1123 TWh, from HQ TransÉnergie, 2009). This
is a realistic constraint, given that the actual peak load in 2007 was less than
35 000 MW (see Figure 1), for a production capacity of 46 220 MW. Further-
more, hydropower production in Quebec is limited by water availability, more
than by actual plant capacity. We assume away thermal and wind generation,
which represent less than 8% of the capacity (and even less of the actual energy
production).9
Ontario marginal production costs, determining which technology is used on
a hourly basis, are modelled in two parts. First, the nuclear marginal production
cost is set constant at $4.6/MWh.10 This is an estimate of the combined fuel
and operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of nuclear production (see for
instance EIA, 2007:77 and IEA, 2005:44). Second, the marginal production cost
for thermal production is assumed to be increasing linearly as more thermal
capacity is used. Real 2007 price data are used to estimate this part of the
Ontario marginal cost curve. Figure 2 illustrates price-quantity pairs for the
8 760 hours of 2007, in Ontario. A simple linear regression of observed prices
9The thermal production in Quebec was dominated by the nuclear production (3%) in 2007
and much of the remaining is oﬀ-grid to supply remote communities in Northern regions. In
2007, combustion turbines represented less than 2% of the total Quebec dispatched production
(Statistics Canada, 2009).
10This cost actually covers the combined nuclear and hydro production in Ontario. As
already mentioned, there is less flexibility in using hydropower in Ontario compared to Quebec.
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Figure 2: Marginal Production Cost Estimate for Generation in Ontario
and loads in Ontario provides parameters for the second part of the marginal
cost function.
In Quebec, the marginal production cost is considered constant at $3.3/MWh,
which is the estimated variable operation and maintenance cost for hydropower
in EIA (2007:77).
3.3.3 Fixed Cost Data
EIA (2007) provides some estimates of investment and fixed O&M costs for var-
ious generation technologies; see Table 2. Using these estimates, the economic
lifetime of these technologies and the discount rate of 6%, an annual fixed cost,
per MW can be estimated for each technology.
Using the real Ontario and Quebec capacities and the above numbers, the
annual fixed cost the Ontario electricity industry faces is estimated at $3.102










Coal 40 1 290 25 910 85 735
Natural Gas 25 594 11 010 46 466
Hydro 60 1 500 13 140 92 813
Nuclear 40 2 081 63 880 138 306
Oil 40 420 11 400 27 913
Wind 20 1 202 28 510 104 795
Wood Waste 40 1 869 50 180 124 216
Table 2: Technology Cost Parameters
3.3.4 Transmission Constraints and Cost
In 2007, the operating security limits for exports from Quebec to Ontario was
1,295 MW, while is was 720 MW for Quebec imports from Ontario. Real hourly
maximum transmission capacities diﬀer from these numbers. HQ TransÉnergie
(2009) provides such capacities for every hour of the year. These can be used
to set maximum import and export quantities. However, observed exports and
imports show that transmission lines are only used, on average, at 29.9% of the
full capacity for Quebec exports (to Ontario) and at 53.2% of the full capacity for
Quebec imports (from Ontario). This is likely due to transmission constraints
attached to the grid topology which are not modelled here. In order to better
calibrate trade in the model and to better reflect real market outcomes, hourly
transmission capacities are adjusted by a ratio set such that the aggregated
modelled export and import values match the observed ones.
A transaction cost of $2/MWh of traded electricity is applied in the model.
This cost, which is not obvious to quantify, is only an estimate. Indeed, elec-
tricity sellers in Ontario are not charged any transmission fee: the Ontario
Provincial Transmission Service Rate only applies to consumers withdrawing
electricity from the network. Exports from Ontario, however, have to pay a
$1/MWh "Export Transmission Service Rate". In Quebec, a $8.22/MWh Non-
Firm Point-to-Point Transmission Services fee has to be paid to HQ TransEn-
ergie. However, as Hydro-Quebec dominates the markets and is the principal
trader, this fee is charged to one division (production) from another one (trans-
mission), but does not aﬀect the overall profitability of the company.
3.3.5 Emission Data and Marginal Damage
Greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions from electricity production in Ontario and
Quebec in 2007 were respectively 34 million of tonnes (Mt) and 1.95 Mt (Envi-
ronment Canada, 2009). On average, coal production in Ontario is responsible
for about 0.94 t/MWh, while natural gas production emits about half, 0.43
t/MWh (Environment Canada, 2008).11 We only report these two number be-
11Specific GHG intensity by source of electricity production (in g 2 eq/kWh) are not
reported for 2007 in Environment Canada (2009). We use instead 2006 Ontario values from
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cause emissions from other sources are not significant.
Estimates for the social marginal damage of a ton of GHG greatly vary.
IPCC (2007) reports estimates from -$3 to $95/t, with an average of $12/t. Tol
(2005) analyses 28 peer-reviewed marginal damage cost estimate studies, and
finds an average value of $93/t, while the median is $14/t. In both cases, high
uncertainty characterizes these values.
To provide an order of magnitude from a Canadian perspective, British
Colombia implemented a carbon tax in 2008, which reached the value of $30/t
in 2012 (Province of British Columbia, 2009). In a diﬀerent continent, GHG
credits for December 2009 were trading at 10.05 in the European Climate
Exchange, on February 9, 2009. Credits for future years were trading at higher
prices, reaching 13.70 for a December 2014 credit. Note that, in our setting,
it takes a marginal damage greater than $56/t for natural gas units to become
more economical to operate than coal units, that would then only be used in
peak load periods.
3.3.6 Computing Market Equilibria
Given our market model and its calibration to Ontario and Quebec, it is possible
to compute hourly market equilibria for our three regimes of interest, as seen in
Propositions 1-4. The implementation of the model requires finding the unique
value of  the Lagrange multiplier associated to the "Total water availability",
which is such that all markets balance. Given transaction costs, either exports,
imports or no trade happen between the two jurisdictions.
A single constraint binds electricity supply in Quebec: the sum of Quebec
hydropower production cannot exceed 1847 TWh over all hours of the year:
8760X
=1
 ≤ 184 705 000
Basic properties of the diﬀerent cases are used to compute the actual equilib-
rium: price is equal to marginal cost in Ontario and to average cost in Quebec
in the two first regimes (here, average cost is $27.90/MWh for regime 2, while
it is $29.02/MWh in regime 1, due to the absence of imports from Ontario to
Quebec); exports and imports are done at the Ontario marginal cost; under
integration, Ontario and Quebec prices are equal, unless transmission capacity
becomes binding.
Transmission capacity constraints provide upper and lower bounds on trade,
and constrained prices are computed. The challenge consists of finding the single
Quebec price that will make use of all the available hydropower while respecting
all the (first order) conditions of the problem. As shown in propositions 1 and
3, the problem can be solved by optimization. There is a single price for very
hour in Quebec, because the Quebec price is the shadow cost of water, which is
unique over the year.
Environment Canada (2008), which reports them.
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4 Results for the Three Regimes
4.1 Calibrated Model Results
Our model of the 2007 Ontario () and Quebec () markets is calibrated to
reflect actual trade between these two jurisdictions operating under a mixed
market structure (shallow integration). In 2007, Ontario exported 1.93 TWh to
Quebec, and imported 0.807 TWh from Quebec, for a net export total of 1.123
TWh. Our model of shallow integration (R2) exactly replicates such export and
import numbers. Ontario prices do not perfectly match, however real 2007 price,
as shown in Table 3. Our model R2 (shallow integration) slightly overestimates
Ontario prices ($48.52/MWh, on average, against a real average hourly price of
$47.81), the Ontario export price to Quebec ($38.84/ MWh against $37.15) and
the import price to Ontario ($71/ MWh against $67.20). The Quebec average






 4781 4796 4852 4679
 2790 2902 2790 3091
Export from  3715 − 3884 2280
Export from  6720 − 7100 5388
Min  −04** 460 460 460
Max  43653 16766 16539 16539
*Average Ontario export and Quebec export prices are
computed from HQ TransÉnergie (2009) and IESO (2008a).
**This negative price occurred during an August night and are among a few outliers.
Figure 2 shows that minimum prices are at about $4
Table 3: Price Results
What is interesting to comment is the diﬀerence between the three regimes:
autarky (R1), shallow integration (R2) and deep integration (R3). Autarky
brings slightly lower average prices to Ontario, as it does not have to produce
more to export to Quebec. In Quebec, because there is less available energy,
prices are also higher ($29.02/MWh against $27.90). Fully integrating both
markets by using marginal cost pricing (with limited transmission capacity)
increases the Quebec price by $3/MWh (+10.8%), while the Ontario price goes
down to $46.79/MWh (-3.5%), given its access to more imports from Quebec.
Table 4 provides the demand and supply quantities resulting from the pre-
vailing prices. The Ontario demand (using a demand price elasticity of -0.15)
slightly increase in autarky (+0.27%, due to lower prices) compared to shallow
integration. Under deep integration, demand increases by 0.56%, again due
to the lower prices. In Quebec, the opposite happens: -0.6% in autarky and
-1.62% under deep integration, compared to shallow integration. On the supply
side, relatively important generation reductions happen in Ontario: almost 1
TWh would not be generated in autarky (-0.42%), while 3 TWh (-1.29%) less
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would be produced under deep integration. Of course, these reductions lead to
lower profits for Ontario generators, as shown in Table 5. Obviously, supply
from Quebec remains stable at 184.70 TWh. The share of trade increases with
shallow integration (from R1 to R2) and again with deep integration (R3). It
still remains a small fraction of total consumption.
TWh 2007
Data
R1 R2 R3P 16225 16239 16194 16285P 18582 18470 18582 182823
Total Demand 348083 34709 34777 34567P  n.a. 16239 16306 16096P  n.a. 18470 18470 18470
Share of Trade* n.a. 0% 079% 083%
*Sum of exports and imports over overall demand.





Change of Consumer Surplus  n.a. +61 − +275
Change of Consumer Surplus  n.a. −208 − −554
Change of Profit  n.a. −63 − −275
Change of Profit  n.a. +198 − +601
Consumer Surplus+Profit n.a. −12 − +47
Coal Emissions (million t) 2874 2929 2860
NG Emissions (million t) 886 890 831
Total Emissions (million t) 34 3760 3819 3692
Table 5: Welfare Impacts
While Ontario consumers marginally increase their surplus in autarky (+$61
million, or $4.76 per capita), they benefit more from integration (+$275 million,
or $21.50 per capita); see Table 5. Quebec consumers, on the other hand,
lose much more in either case: -$27.05 per capita (-$208 million globally) with
autarky, or -$71.97 per capita (-$554 million) with integration, as they lose
their regulated access to low-price electricity. However, the limited transmission
capacity "protects" them against a further increase. Sharing a similar outcome,
Ontario producers see their profit decrease with lower production levels, both
in autarky (-$63 million) and integration (-$275 million). It is clear from these
results that while consumers in Quebec don’t want integration, opposition would
also be strong from Ontario producers. Profit for the Quebec producer, however,
would increase a lot from higher local prices and additional exports, made at
a even higher price (as compared to the local price). In the integrated regime
(R3), as compared to shallow integration (R2), additional profits in Quebec
(+$601 million) are more than twice the decrease in profits faced by Ontario
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producers (-$275 million). Net gains per capita amount to -$0.62 from regime 2
to 1 and to $2.31 from regime 2 to 3, without accounting for GHG emissions. As
emissions decrease by 1.76 Mt from regime 2 to 3, while welfare increases by $47
million (see Table 5), we obtain an abatement cost of -$37.16/t. This result,
although expected, is striking as GHG emission reduction eﬀorts are usually
associated with a positive cost.
When damages from emissions are accounted for, as illustrated in Table 6,
regime 2 is clearly the worse in terms of total welfare. Indeed, total emissions
(especially from coal power plants) increase from R1 to R2 (+1.5%). The dam-
age is therefore lower in autarky, as shown in Table 5. This comes from Quebec
imports from Ontario in oﬀ-peak periods, in part re-exported during peak pe-
riods. Under integration, total emissions decrease by 3.34%, as power plants
in Ontario are used less often. Let us again emphasize that these reductions
in GHG emissions come with an overall welfare improvement, as illustrated in
Table 6.
Change in Million $ R1 R2 R3
 CS + Profit −241 − +030
 CS + Profit −1028 − +4712
Total CS+Profit −1270 − +4742
Marginal Damage  (@20$/t) −1180 − −2552
Marginal Damage  (@20$/t) −1180 − −2552
Total Damage (@40$/t) −2361 − −5105
Total Welfare (CS+Profit-Damage) +1091 − +9847
Table 6: Total Welfare Impacts
Only if the damage cost was lower than $21.5/t would trade gains made
under shallow integration (R2) be greater than the environmental cost resulting
from higher emissions. Interpreted diﬀerently, removing transmission (going
from R2 to R1) would lead to lower emissions and a lower welfare, equivalent
to an abatement cost of $21.5/t.
4.2 Doubling Transmission Capacity
In the previous section, all results were presented for transmission capacities
between 93 and 451 MW for Quebec to Ontario flows and 92 to 391 MW for
Ontario to Quebec flows. These transmission capacities were adjusted from
reported maximum transmission capacities to better model real 2007 power
exchange between the two provinces. It is interesting to analyze the impact of
an increase in transmission capacity between the two jurisdictions, as indeed
it happened in 2010, with the addition of about 1,000 MW of transmission
capacity. This was an initiative of the Quebec producer. In this section, we
provide results for twice the initial modelled transmission capacity.
In Table 7, doubling the transmission capacity under shallow integration
(R2 x2) and deep integration (R3 x2) further decreases the price in Ontario,
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compared to the initial outcome (reproduced in Table 7). In Quebec, the price
increase only happens under deep integration (as average cost is not used any-
more), and is significantly higher than previously ($32.48/MWh compared to
$30.91 with half the transmission capacity). More transmission capacity also
reduces export and import prices, except under integration for the Ontario ex-
port price: it grows from $22.80/MWh to $24.97. There are actually two price
eﬀects. The increase in arbitrage across periods that follow from the increase in
trade capacities tend to reduce the price gap between import and export periods
in Ontario.12 On top of this, there is an average price eﬀect that follow from
changes in net traded volume. In particular, under deep integration, Quebec be-
comes a net exporter of electricity (from a net importer situation under shallow
integration), because more hydropower is available for exports as a result of the
lower Quebec consumption.
Average price
$/MWh R2 R3 R2 x2 R3 x2
 4852 4679 4841 4580
 2790 3091 2790 3248
Export from  3884 2280 3760 2497
Export from  7100 5388 6524 5291
Min  460 460 460 460
Max  16539 16539 16312 16312
Table 7: Price Results for Twice the Transmission Capacity
Trends already observed in terms of consumption and production (in Table
4) are again observed in Table 8. One exception, however, is worth mentioning:
total consumption in Ontario goes down with more transmission (-0.08%), de-
spite lower (unweighted) average price13 (-0.22%; Table 7). This is due to the
fact that hourly patterns lead to some price increase and some price decrease.
On a hourly basis, changes are consistent with the price-quantity relationship,
but on the aggregate, a smaller average price and a smaller total consumption
are observed. Quebec consumption decreases by 0.86% in the R3 x2 case, as
compared to R3. This is 2.46% less than consumption under shallow integra-
tion (R2 x2 or R2 - Since price is regulated in Regime 2, Québec consumption
is identical in both cases). Overall total demand decreases by 0.95% in R3 x2
as compared to R2.
Table 9 displays losses and gains similar to those of Table 5. Additional
transmission capacity further increases consumer surplus in Ontario, while it
further reduces the consumer surplus in Quebec (except under R2 x2, where
price remains constant for consumers despite more access to the Ontario mar-
ket). Profits of the Ontario producers continue to shrink, while the Quebec
12The Quebec producer imports as much as possible during low-price periods, to re-export
at higher price. These additional Quebec imports from Ontario increase the Ontario (export)
price, while re-exporting this energy decreases the (Ontario) import price.
13A weighted average price would weigh hourly price by the hourly consumption.
22
TWh R2 R3 R2 x2 R3 x2P 16194 16285 16181 16320P 18582 182823 18582 18125
Total Demand 34777 34567 34764 34446P  16306 16096 16293 15975P  18470 18470 18470 18470
Share of Trade* 079% 083% 153% 162%
*Sum of exports and imports over overall demand.
Table 8: Supply and Demand Results for Twice the Transmission Capacity
producer continues to increase its own profit. This is an important driver for
the addition of transmission capacity. Export revenues grow in all cases, as
would be expected with more trade opportunities. Emissions are made worse
under shallow integration with more transmission capacity (+0.39%), especially
from the more intense imports made in oﬀ-peak periods. There are more coal
emissions, while natural gas emissions go down. In the R3 x2 case, emissions
decrease even more (-1.52%), as compared to R3. The abatement cost for the
additional emissions is -$91.86/t, as a result of the high profits made on some hy-
dropower replacing natural gas. This value comes from the welfare and emission
diﬀerences between R3 x2 and R3, as shown in Table 9 .
Million $ R2 R3 R2 x2 R3 x2
Change of Consumer Surplus  − +275 +54 +466
Change of Consumer Surplus  − −554 0 −840
Change of Profit  − −275 −84 −458
Change of Profit  − 601 32 931
Consumer Surplus+Profit − +47 +2 +99
Coal Emissions (million t) 2929 2860 2967 2853
NG Emissions (million t) 890 831 862 782
Total Emissions (million t) 3819 3692 3834 3636
Table 9: Welfare Impacts for Twice the Transmission Capacity
Table 10, the last one, shows that more trade (through more integration
and/or more transmission capacity) increases welfare, before accounting for en-
vironmental damages. As shown by Billette de Villemeur and Pineau (2012),
this was not completely obvious as price regulation may result in trade being
ineﬃcient. As a matter of facts, in Regime 2, the welfare gains that follow from
doubling the capacity are very low. Beyond this, we illustrate with this exam-
ple that increasing trade under shallow integration can be welfare-damaging,
even if the Quebec producer increases its profits. After accounting for emission
damages, the net gain from trade might indeed be negative. Only if the total
damage per tonne is lower than $17.40 would the trade gain be greater than the
additional damages. Another interpretation for this value of $17.40/t is that it
represents the abatement cost of emissions through reducing the transmission
23
capacity between the two markets (under shallow integration).
Note also that additional transmission investment costs are not accounted
for in these regimes. A more thorough analysis should include them.
Change in Million $ R2 R3 R2 x2 R3 x2
 CS + Profit (Billion) − +030 −2939 +802
 CS + Profit (Billion) − +4712 +3200 +9094
Total CS+Profit (Billion) − +4742 +261 +9896
Marginal Damage  (@20$/t, Billion) − −2552 +300 −3675
Marginal Damage  (@20$/t, Billion) − −2552 +300 −3675
Total Damage (40$/t, Billion) − −5105 +600 −735
Total Welfare (CS+Profit-Damage) − +9847 −338 +17245
Table 10: Total Welfare Impacts for Twice the Transmission Capacity
5 Conclusion
This paper oﬀers both a theoretical and an empirical perspective on welfare
impacts of electricity market integration, taking generating capacity as given.
Integration is on the policy agenda of many governments and institutions, but
is seldom analyzed theoretically or empirically. We propose a multi-period two-
jurisdiction electricity market model to study integration impacts in terms of
welfare implications and emissions, with insights on their distribution. This
model involves a competitive thermal jurisdiction with a marginal pricing policy
and a hydro one with an average-cost pricing regulation. A detailed calibration
is made using Ontario and Quebec (Canada) production and demand data.
Under various integration regimes (autarky, shallow integration and deep
integration), we are able to obtain results showing how production, price and
emissions evolve. This modelling eﬀort represents the first contribution of the
paper, as the literature so far has not focussed on comparable detailed integra-
tion outcomes. The second contribution comes from estimates of GHG abate-
ment costs in the electricity sector, resulting from integration. With electricity
being an important contributor to world GHG emissions, abatement opportu-
nities with negative cost (as we find in this paper) should be contemplated.
Numerical results show that increasingly lower prices would be observed
in the thermal jurisdiction if deep integration would be implemented (-3.5%)
and transmission capacity doubled (a further -2.1%). This benefits consumers,
but not producers in the thermal jurisdiction. On the contrary, in the hydro
jurisdiction, consumers face higher prices (and therefore lose some surplus) with
deep integration (+10.8%) and more transmission capacity (+5.1%), while profit
significantly increase for the hydro producer. Emissions follow the thermal
producers’s fate: they decrease as integration develops. Remarkably in a world
where GHG emissions reduction are often associated with a cost, a negative
abatement cost is obtained: -$37.16/t under deep integration, jumping to -
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$91.86/t for the additional reduction that would follow doubling the additional
transmission capacity.
This paper also oﬀer an important warning. Under shallow integration, (i.e.
when the hydro jurisdiction stick to its average pricing policy), any additional
trading leads to higher emission levels. In other words, if the institutional
settings continue to be overlooked when proceeding to electricity market inte-
gration, integrating an hydro-jurisdiction to a thermal one is actually likely to
be environmentally damaging.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: In Regime 2, when  is exporting, the price in jurisdiction
 is at most  = −   When  is importing, the price in jurisdiction 
is no less than  = +  . If  =  = 0 then
   =  0
¡ ¢  
The proof of Proposition 2 is based upon the following intermediate result:
Proposition 5 1Computing the equilibrium in Regime 2 amounts to solve the
optimization program
max




"Z  + −
0
 ()  − 





¡ −  ¢ ≤ − 8760X
=1

¡ ¢  −  ≤  −  ≤  
all  = 1  8760
Let L denote the Lagrangian associated with the optimization problem of




"Z  + −
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£ ¡ −  +  ¢+  ¡ −  +  ¢¤ 
Absent transmission constraints, price patterns are easily characterised. The
FOC
¡L ¢ = 0 implies that  = 0 ¡ ¢ 
If   0 then
¡L ¢ = 0 yields  =  +  ; if   0 then¡L ¢ = 0 yields  = −  ; if  =  = 0 then we have:
−  ≤  =  0
¡ ¢ ≤ +  
>From the optimization program of Proposition 1 and by definition of the
hourly Lagrange multipliers of the transmission constraint  and   when is exporting, that is   0 but the transmission constraint is binding, we
have14
 = +  + 
14This is the first-order condition obtained by derivation of the Lagrangian with respect to
the variable  
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with  =  ≥ 0 (and  = 0) Thus  ≥ 
Similarly, when  is exporting, that is   0, but the transmission constraint
is binding, then15
 = −  − 
with  =  ≥ 0 (and  = 0). Thus  ≤ 
If      the marginal benefits from trade are strictly lower than
the transmission costs   It is both welfare- and profit-maximising to restrain
from trading. Clearly, we still have  =  0
¡ ¢ 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4: In Regime 3, when  is exporting, the price in jurisdiction
 is at most  =  −   When  is importing, the price in jurisdiction is no less than  =  +  . If  =  = 0 then
   =  0
¡ ¢  
The equality  =  =  is obtained from the first-order condition asso-
ciated to the choice of  in the optimization program of Proposition 3. The
demonstration is then identical to that of Proposition 2 above.
B Estimating Quebec hourly demand
For a hour  (in a month ), the Quebec demand  is estimated by an aﬃne
transformation of the Ontario demand ( ):
 =  + 
In order to compute  and , we use for every month the observed ratio
between Quebec and Ontario peak demands ( ) and total consumptions









 = ¡ − ¢
where  is the number of hours in month .
15This is the first-order condition obtained by derivation of the Lagrangian with respect to
the variable  
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To summarize, we observe hourly Ontario prices from IESO (2008a) and
hourly Ontario demands from IESO (2008b). With NERC (2008) and the above
aﬃne transformation, we estimate hourly Quebec demands. Quebec energy
price is fixed at $27.90/MWh.
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